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RESTANI, Judge. 
 Defendant Craig B. Sokolow ("Sokolow") appeals from his 
conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania following a two month jury trial.  On 
March 18, 1994, Sokolow was convicted of 107 counts of mail fraud 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988), 17 counts of money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1988), and one count 
of criminal forfeiture in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1988). 
Following several sentencing hearings, the district judge 
sentenced Sokolow to 92 months in prison, to be followed by three 
years supervised release, and ordered a $50,000 fine, $6200 in 
special assessments, $690,246.34 in restitution, and the 
forfeiture of $2.1 million.  On appeal, defendant challenges both 
his conviction and sentencing.  For the reasons stated herein, we 
will affirm the conviction, sentencing, and the order of 
forfeiture, but remand for reconsideration of the restitution 
order. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
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 The events leading to Sokolow's indictment and subsequent 
conviction occurred between May 1, 1987 and July 23, 1990. 
Sokolow, an attorney and licensed insurance agent, offered health 
benefits plans to the public in Pennsylvania and several other 
states through a series of corporations that he established and 
controlled, but primarily through the National Independent 
Business Association, Inc. ("NIBA").0  The plans were marketed to 
small business employers, their employees, and their families. 
Association Insurance Marketing, Inc. ("AIM"), a corporation 
established and controlled by Sokolow, served as the primary 
marketing arm of NIBA.  Through AIM, Sokolow received commissions 
on all premiums received for the sale of NIBA policies. 
 Prior to May 1987, NIBA members were fully insured by NIBA's 
group insurance contract with World Life and Health Insurance 
Company ("World Company").  On May 1, 1987, Sokolow replaced 
World Life with Independence Blue Cross and Pennsylvania Blue 
Shield to administer and process NIBA's health care claims. 
Sokolow purchased stop-loss coverage from Blue Cross, whereby 
NIBA assumed responsibility for the payment of NIBA members' 
medical care claims up to the first $25,000.  Blue Cross would 
pay any remaining claims in excess of $25,000.  The indictment 
charged that Sokolow falsely represented to the public that NIBA 
                     
0
  In 1984, Sokolow began offering his health benefits plan 
through the Pennsylvania Independent Business Association, Inc. 
("PIBA").  NIBA was established as a successor to PIBA in 1987. 
In 1988, NIBA was succeeded by the American Independent Business 
Alliance, Inc. ("AIBA"), the association existing until the time 
of liquidation on February 15, 1990.  For convenience, "NIBA" 
will be used throughout the opinion to refer to the various 
corporations. 
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was fully-insured by Blue Cross, when, in fact, it was a self-
funded plan, thus defrauding members of their premiums.  In 
addition, Sokolow allegedly used the Blue Cross logo on marketing 
and billing materials, in violation of NIBA's agreement with Blue 
Cross, to foster the impression that NIBA was the equivalent of a 
Blue Cross fully-insured health benefits plan.   
 On June 30, 1988, Blue Cross terminated its service plan 
with NIBA when Sokolow failed to pay approximately $2 million in 
claims for which Blue Cross sought reimbursement.  Sokolow then 
contracted with another company for higher stop-loss coverage 
that required NIBA to pay the first $50,000 of a member's medical 
care claims.  The indictment alleged that Sokolow again 
misrepresented that NIBA was fully insured by the new coverage, 
when, in fact, it was self-funded.   
 After receiving complaints concerning NIBA's claims 
administration in late 1988, the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Department (the "Department") began to investigate NIBA's 
operations.  The Department determined that Sokolow had been 
operating NIBA as an illegal, unlicensed insurer in Pennsylvania. 
Sokolow objected to the Department's inquiries on the basis that 
NIBA was a Multi-Employer Welfare Arrangement ("MEWA") that could 
file a benefits plan under ERISA and, thus, was not subject to 
state regulation.0  The Department disagreed with Sokolow's 
                     
0
  Although Sokolow represented to the Department that he could 
have filed the NIBA plan under ERISA, the evidence at trial 
indicated that Sokolow represented to Virginia and Maryland 
insurance regulators that the NIBA health plan was, in fact, 
filed as an ERISA plan with the United States Department of 
Labor, and, thus, not subject to state regulation.  Trial 
5 
contentions and, on May 2, 1989, suspended NIBA's operations.  On 
August 31, 1989, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania ruled 
that NIBA did not constitute a valid MEWA plan, but was a 
commercial enterprise "marketing insurance, without the benefit 
of a licensed company status, while purporting to be a valid 
ERISA plan, such that state licensing would not be necessary."0 
Appellant's App. [hereinafter "App."] at 1193.  Consequently, 
NIBA was ordered liquidated by the commonwealth court on February 
15, 1990.   
 Sokolow collected more than $34 million in premiums from 
NIBA plan members who were allegedly defrauded by Sokolow during 
the period covered by the indictment.  The indictment alleged 
that Sokolow converted approximately $4 million of the premiums 
for his personal benefit.  He received $2,239,575.67 in 
commissions through AIM and two other related insurance 
companies0 ($1,837,152.30 of those commissions went to AIM) and 
$1,806,259.23 in salary, officer's loans, and other 
disbursements.  These monies were deposited into AIM and NIBA 
accounts.  The indictment alleged that Sokolow laundered these 
                                                                  
testimony established, however, that Sokolow never filed the NIBA 
plan with ERISA for the years 1987 through 1990. 
0
  For purposes of determining insurance agents' liability, a 
later en banc ruling of the commonwealth court found that NIBA 
was a MEWA and not an insurance entity operating under 
Pennsylvania state law.  Pennsylvania Ass'n of Life Underwriters 
v. Foster, 645 A.2d 907, 911-12 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (en banc), 
aff'd without op., 668 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1995) (per curiam). 
0
  The related companies were Sokolow & McMillan, and Sokolow, 
McMillan & O'Leary, two "in-house" insurance agencies of which 
Sokolow was a partner, and which sold NIBA health benefits plans. 
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funds through a number of bank and brokerage accounts, as well as 
real property and mortgages.   
 The jury trial commenced on January 10, 1994, and concluded 
on March 18, 1994, with the return of guilty verdicts on all 
counts considered by the jury.  Sentencing proceedings were held 
on January 6 and 11, and February 6, 1995, during which 
sentencing issues were argued, and evidence of forfeiture, loss 
calculations, and restitution was presented.  On March 14, 1995, 
the district court filed three separate Memorandum Opinions and 
Orders, inter alia, determining the Sentencing Guidelines 
calculations, and ordering the restitution and forfeiture 
obligation.  Following entry of judgment, Sokolow filed this 
timely appeal challenging both his conviction and sentence. 
II.  CHALLENGES TO THE CONVICTION 
 A. Evidentiary Challenges 
 Sokolow challenges three evidentiary rulings made by the 
district court.  Sokolow claims that the district court (1) erred 
in admitting into evidence Government Exhibit B-110 ("Gov't Ex. 
B-110"), a summary of unpaid insurance claims of NIBA members; 
(2) improperly allowed evidence of NIBA's alleged operation as an 
unlicensed insurance company; and (3) abused its discretion in 
admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial victim impact 
testimony.  To the extent the district court's admission of 
evidence was based on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, our standard of review is plenary.  See United States 
v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 
7 
1062 (1990).  Our review of a district court's ruling to admit or 
exclude evidence, if premised on a permissible view of the law, 
however, is only for an abuse of discretion.  See id.; see also 
United States v. Versaint, 849 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1988).  We 
will address each of Sokolow's evidentiary challenges in turn. 
  1. Government Exhibit B-110 
 Sokolow contends that Gov't Ex. B-110 is inadmissible 
hearsay.  Gov't Ex. B-110 is a compilation and summary of over $7 
million in unpaid insurance claims of NIBA members.  The document 
was prepared for the Department in July 1992 by Inservco, a 
third-party administrator hired to adjust the unpaid claims after 
the commonwealth court ordered the liquidation of NIBA. 
Originally, NIBA members' claims were documented in the course of 
regularly conducted business by NIBA's third party administrators 
-- National Benefits Corp., Insurance Benefits Services ("IBS"), 
and Independent Insurance Administrators ("IIA").  The companies 
processed NIBA claims and kept records on behalf of NIBA, which 
Sokolow later authorized to be turned over to the Department's 
Statutory Liquidator in connection with NIBA's liquidation.  As 
custodian of the NIBA plan records, the Statutory Liquidator made 
the records available to Inservco for the adjustment of unpaid 
claims.   
 Over Sokolow's objection, the district court admitted the 
exhibit as an admission by Sokolow, under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C).0  The district court reasoned: 
                     
0
  Rule 801(d)(2)(C) provides that  
 
8 
Inservco summarized information held by the Statutory 
Liquidator, who in turn obtained the information from 
another administrator hired by Sokolow.  Each entity 
that held the information had the express authorization 
of [Sokolow].  As such, Exhibit B-110 is a party 
admission . . . . 
United States v. Sokolow, No. 93-394-01, 1994 WL 613640, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1994).  We disagree with the district court's 
reasoning. 
 Rule 801(d)(2)(C) specifically excludes from the definition 
of hearsay any statements used against a party which were made by 
another person authorized by the party to make a statement 
concerning the subject.  Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C); Lightning 
Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1198 (3d Cir. 1993).  We 
find, and the government admits, that Inservco's adjustments to 
the NIBA members' claims were not "done with Sokolow's consent or 
at his direction," and, thus, are not admissions by Sokolow.  See 
Appellee's Br. at 23.  The government continues to assert, 
however, that the collection of these claims by NIBA's third-
party administrators constitutes an admission by Sokolow, and 
are, thus, not hearsay.  This argument is untenable.  Rule 
801(d)(2)(C) requires that the declarant be an agent of the 
party-opponent against whom the admission is offered.  Kirk v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 164 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 1015 (1996).  We find that neither the 
underlying claims submitted by NIBA insurance beneficiaries to 
                                                                  
[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement 
is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by 
a person authorized by the party to make a statement 
concerning the subject. 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C). 
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NIBA's third-party administrators nor Sokolow's subsequent 
release of these records to the Department constitutes an 
admission by Sokolow.  Thus, Gov't Ex. B-110 is hearsay because 
the entries of NIBA members' claims, whether or not adjusted by 
Inservco, were written out-of-court statements offered to prove 
not merely the existence but the genuineness of the claims, and 
ultimately, the underfunding of Sokolow's enterprise. 
 We now turn to whether Gov't Ex. B-110 falls within one of 
the exceptions to the hearsay exclusion.  The government argues 
that Gov't Ex. B-110 is admissible under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule.0  This exception allows the 
admission of hearsay documents provided a foundation is laid by 
"the custodian or other qualified witness" that: 
(1) [t]he declarant in the records had personal 
knowledge to make accurate statements; (2) the 
declarant recorded the statements contemporaneously 
with the actions that were the subject of the reports; 
(3) the declarant made the record in the regular course 
of the business activity; and (4) such records were 
regularly kept by the business. 
                     
0
  Pursuant to Rule 803(6), the following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
 
  Records of regularly conducted activity.  A memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near 
the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person 
with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, 
unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 
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United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 200 (3d Cir. 1992).  
 We find that Gov't Ex. B-110 is admissible under the 
business records exception.  Contrary to Sokolow's contentions, 
the NIBA members' claims were collected in the course of 
regularly conducted business of NIBA's original claims 
administrators.  IIA initially received NIBA plan member 
information from IBS, a prior third party administrator, with 
Sokolow's consent and authorization.  Pursuant to the liquidation 
order, Sokolow specifically authorized the IIA to "release any 
and all data base information as required concerning [NIBA] on 
the in-house history tapes and claims system to the 
[Department]."  App. at 826.  Joseph DiMemmo testified that as 
the representative of the Statutory Liquidator, he took custody 
of all NIBA records.  We find that a clear chain of custody and 
foundation for this data, upon which Inservco based its claims 
adjustment, was established. 
 As to the claim adjustments made by Inservco, and summarized 
in Gov't Ex. B-110, we find that this data also falls within the 
business records exception.  As a third party administrator, 
Inservco contracted with the Department to administer NIBA health 
insurance claims.  The claims adjustments made by Inservco were 
the same type of adjustments NIBA's third party administrators 
would have had to make if NIBA had stayed in business.  Margaret 
Lee attested to the authenticity of Gov't Ex. B-110 and laid the 
foundation for its admission.  Lee testified that Gov't Ex. B-110 
was derived from Inservco's claims processing system and that 
these records were made and kept in Inservco's regular course of 
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business.  In sum, we find that the government properly 
established the admissibility of Gov't Ex. B-110 under the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
 Defendant asserts, however, that the methods and 
circumstances under which Inservco prepared the summary of claims 
were untrustworthy and unreliable.  Sokolow argues that many 
claims were not checked for pre-existing conditions, double 
submissions, or the timeliness of the claims.  We disagree. 
Inservco adjusted the claims according to NIBA policy guidelines, 
and these adjustments were subject to committee review and 
oversight by the Department.  Final approval of the claim 
adjustments was made by the Department.  Although the adjustments 
made by Inservco did not take into account the timeliness of 
claims, trial testimony indicated that this information could not 
be determined from the submissions made to the Department. 
Further, Sokolow offers no specific evidence that the claims were 
not properly inspected by Inservco.  Much of the evidence 
indicates the contrary.  In any event, such questions go to the 
weight to be given to Gov't Ex. B-110, and not its admissibility. 
 Finally, Sokolow claims that Gov't Ex. B-110 is a public 
report under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C),0 and, thus, 
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  Rule 803(8)(C) excepts from the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
 
  Public records and reports.  Records, reports, 
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of 
public offices or agencies, setting forth, . . . in 
civil actions and proceedings and against the 
Government in criminal cases, factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
12 
should be excluded under the rationale set forth in United States 
v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).  There the court held that, 
"police and evaluative reports not satisfying the standards of 
[Federal Rules of Evidence] 803(8)(B) and (C) may not qualify for 
admission under [Rule] 803(6) or any of the other exceptions to 
the hearsay rule."  Id. at 77.  Generally, a public report 
consisting of "factual findings resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by law," is not admissible 
against a criminal defendant under Rule 803(8)(C).  We agree with 
Sokolow that Gov't Ex. B-110 contains some indicia of a public 
report under Rule 803(8)(C).  In processing NIBA members' claims, 
Inservco was performing a fact-finding function and acting 
essentially as the agent of the Department, which was required to 
liquidate NIBA pursuant to state law.  We disagree, however, with 
Sokolow's contention that the findings made by the Department, 
i.e. Inservco's adjustments, were inadmissible under the Oates 
rule.   
 Criticizing Oates as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 
803(8), many courts have declined to import the limitations of 
Rule 803(8)(B)0 and (C) into other hearsay exceptions.  See, 
                                                                  
information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C). 
0
  Rule 803(8)(B) excepts from the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
 
  Public records and reports.  Records, reports, 
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of 
public offices or agencies, setting forth, . . . 
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to 
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, 
13 
e.g., United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir.) 
(upholding admission of DEA report against criminal defendants 
under Rule 803(5) (past recollection recorded)), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 847 (1986); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 
1201 (6th Cir. 1985) (declining to read Rule 803(8)(C) 
limitations into Rule 803(10) (absence of public record or 
entry)), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986).  Although we have not 
specifically addressed this issue,0 the Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits have held that Rule 803(8)(C) does not compel the 
exclusion of documents properly admitted under Rule 803(6) where 
the author testifies.  See United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 
1230 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 672-
73 (7th Cir. 1980).  The Hayes court stated that the Oates rule 
does not apply in such circumstances "because such [investigator] 
testimony protects against the loss of an accused's confrontation 
rights, the underlying rationale for Rule 803(8) and the basis of 
the court's concern in Oates."  861 F.2d at 1230 (citation 
omitted).  We reach the same conclusion here. 
                                                                  
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police 
officers and other law enforcement personnel. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B). 
 
0
  In United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 
1986), we declined to address the applicability of the Oates rule 
to the admission of a Coast Guard report against criminal 
defendants under Rule 803(6), the business records exception. 
Even assuming inadmissibility, we found any error to be harmless. 
Id.  We also noted the many exceptions to the Oates rule, such as 
the admission of law enforcement reports under Rule 803(6) where 
the author is available to testify at trial.  Id. at 173 n.12. We 
declined, however, to decide the appropriateness or applicability 
of such exceptions.  Id. 
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 Here, Margaret Lee, the Inservco employee who supervised the 
claims adjustments, testified and was cross-examined at some 
length.  Lee personally audited part or all of each submitted 
claim and stated that Gov't Ex. B-110 represented the results of 
Inservco's processing of the NIBA members' claims.  We find that 
the circumstances surrounding the preparation of Gov't Ex. B-110 
were probed and there was no loss of confrontation rights.  Thus, 
Gov't Ex. B-110 was properly admissible under the business 
records exception of Rule 803(6), and we will affirm on that 
basis. 
  2. Evidence of NIBA's Non-Licensure 
 At trial, the district court permitted the reading into 
evidence of portions of a ruling made by the Commonwealth Court 
of Pennsylvania upholding the NIBA suspension order entered by 
the Department.0  Denying Sokolow's motion to strike, the 
                     
0
  Relevant excerpts read as follows: 
 
The activities conducted by [NIBA] clearly indicate to 
the Court as a matter of fact and law that [NIBA's] 
business operation clearly was not a valid ERISA 
employment benefit plan. 
 
. . . . 
 
  The Court finds that NIBA was a means by which its 
principal[,] Craig Sokolow[,] was marketing insurance 
without the benefit of licensed company status while 
purporting to be a valid ERISA plan, such that state 
licensing would not be necessary. 
 
 . . . . 
 
Since [NIBA] conducted business in Pennsylvania as an 
insurer without a license, it was appropriate for the 
Commissioner to intervene and take the drastic action 
of suspension.   
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district court ruled that "the probative value [of the opinion] 
outweigh[ed] the prejudicial value."  App. at 608.  In addition, 
various testimony regarding the non-licensure of NIBA was 
permitted to be addressed.   
 Sokolow asserts that the district court erred in admitting 
this evidence.  He argues that (1) the allegations of violations 
of state law were confusing and unduly prejudicial, (2) NIBA's 
alleged non-licensure was not an element of the mail fraud scheme 
alleged in the indictment, (3) prejudicial effect is highlighted 
by the fact that the deliberating jury requested Judge Colins's 
opinion, and (4) the groundlessness of Judge Colins's opinion is 
supported by an en banc decision in a related case by the 
commonwealth court, which found NIBA was a MEWA and not an 
insurance entity under state law.  See supra note 3.  
 We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting this evidence.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 
"[relevant] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."  Fed. R. Evid. 
403.  According to the government, the evidence of non-licensure 
and the reading of Judge Colins's opinion was for the purpose of 
providing background information regarding the suspension and 
liquidation of NIBA.  The non-licensure of NIBA was a factual 
allegation in the indictment which would demonstrate the nature 
                                                                  
App. at 560-61, 1193 [hereinafter "Judge Colins's opinion"]. 
16 
of the fraud scheme and show the factual predicate for NIBA's 
suspension and liquidation.   
 Sokolow asserts that the evidence of non-licensure was 
unduly prejudicial and confusing, as evidenced by the jury's 
request for Judge Colins's opinion.  We disagree.  In responding 
to the jury's request, the district judge submitted the following 
instruction, agreed to by the parties, rather than the requested 
opinion:0 
 [Judge Colins's opinion] was referred to in the 
evidence to give a historical background of the 
proceedings.  The opinion of Judge Collins [sic] is 
just that, an opinion.  Judge Collins [sic] was not a 
witness to the facts.  You have seen and heard the 
witnesses.  You must make your decision on the basis of 
the witnesses['] testimony, exhibits relating to facts 
and the stipulations of counsel - pursuant to my 
instructions on the law. 
App. at 1203.  We find that any prejudicial effect was remedied 
by this instruction.  Additionally, as indicated, Judge Colins's 
ruling formed the basis for the liquidation of NIBA, and although 
non-licensure was not an element of the mail fraud or money 
laundering charges, it was a necessary factual predicate to the 
mail fraud scheme.  Sokolow claimed to have created a valid 
health benefits plan filed with the Department of Labor and 
operating under ERISA, when in fact, no such filing was ever 
made.  Accordingly, we find the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting evidence of NIBA's non-licensure.0 
                     
0
  Sokolow's counsel, although agreeing to the instruction, 
continued his objection to the admissibility of Judge Colins's 
opinion. 
0
  Sokolow also contends that the district court's ruling on this 
issue amounted to collateral estoppel against him.  See United 
States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 897 (3d Cir. 1994) 
17 
  3.   Victim Impact Testimony 
 Sokolow asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion in permitting highly prejudicial victim impact 
testimony to be admitted at trial.  The district court allowed 20 
NIBA members to testify that they were denied payment of their 
claims.  Some witnesses were also permitted to testify as to 
collateral losses that they suffered.  One witness, Kenneth 
Harris, who was injured in an auto race, was permitted to testify 
as to $238,111.46 in unpaid claims, and to his long 
hospitalization and prolonged rehabilitation.  Additionally, he 
was permitted to testify as to problems with collection agencies. 
A year after the jury's verdict, the district court found that 
Harris's claims were "caused by non-covered activity," and, thus, 
he was not entitled to restitution.  Sokolow also points to the 
testimony of Frank Yeager, who became a quadriplegic as a result 
of a gunshot wound.  Sokolow asserts that collateral testimony as 
to this witness's injury, and repeated reference to the injury by 
government counsel in closing arguments, were unduly prejudicial. 
 In general, to satisfy the elements for mail fraud, "[p]roof 
of actual loss by the intended victim is not necessary."  United 
States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 
                                                                  
(holding that defendant's prior conviction by jury for wire fraud 
could not be used as collateral estoppel to establish predicate 
act for violation of RICO in trial before second jury). Sokolow's 
claim is unavailing.  The district court denied the government's 
motion in limine to preclude re-litigation of whether NIBA was an 
unlicensed insurer or qualified as a MEWA under ERISA.  Further, 
as indicated, NIBA's non-licensure was a factual allegation in 
the mail fraud scheme charged in the indictment.  The government 
established at trial that NIBA was neither properly filed with 
the Department of Labor, nor operating under ERISA, as Sokolow 
had falsely represented to various state insurance regulators. 
18 
S.Ct. 488 (1994).  Evidence of loss, however, may be treated as 
evidence of the schemer's intent to defraud.  See id. at 545.  In 
Copple, we found that extensive victim impact testimony as to 
collateral losses "went beyond anything that was reasonable to 
prove [defendant's] specific intent to defraud."  Id.  In that 
case, some of the objectionable collateral impact testimony 
included testimony that money used to pay back losses came from 
savings for children's college educations, that paying back the 
money had affected the witnesses' health, caused weight loss, and 
required depletion of all personal savings.  Id. at 545-46. 
Accordingly, the court found that the district court erred in 
allowing the testimony as the "[t]estimony was designed to 
generate feelings of sympathy for the victims and outrage toward 
[defendant] for reasons not relevant to the charges [defendant] 
faced."  Id. at 546. 
 In the case before us, the victims testified to a careful 
account of the dollar value of the loss suffered as a result of 
the fraud.  Many of the victims also provided significant 
embellishment concerning adverse personal consequences, similar 
to the victims in Copple.0  By asking every victim who testified 
whether he or she suffered any adverse consequences from the 
                     
0
  For example, Suzanne Plattner testified that she had been 
hassled by collection agencies, suffered from depression, and was 
completely tormented; David Ahakinian testified that "his life 
had been destroyed," that he was a "nervous wreck," and that he 
had attorney's bills to pay because his claim was denied.  He 
further testified that Sokolow had "created a monster company." 
In addition, it appears that the claims of David Ahakinian and 
Kenneth Harris were properly denied coverage, yet the district 
court allowed into evidence their testimony regarding economic 
loss as well as adverse consequences. 
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unpaid claims, the government was attempting to highlight the 
personal tragedies of the victims. 
 Such testimony has little, if any, probative value and may 
be unfairly prejudicial.  While normally the balancing under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is done by the district court, for 
purposes of this discussion, we can assume, arguendo, that the 
testimony was in fact prejudicial because we believe that its 
admission was harmless.0  "Trial error is harmless if it is 
highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment."  Id. 
(citing United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 
1993)).  We stated in Simon that a high probability exists where 
the court has a "'sure conviction that the error did not 
prejudice the defendant.'"  995 F.2d at 1244 (quoting United 
States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1500 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation 
omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989)).  In making this 
determination, we are not required to "disprov[e] every 
'reasonable possibility of prejudice.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
 Here the error of admitting the adverse consequences 
testimony was harmless because, as in Copple, 24 F.3d at 526-47, 
the evidence of the scheme to defraud and of Sokolow's specific 
intent was overwhelming.  As we have set forth above, the record 
is replete with proof of Sokolow's intentional misrepresentations 
to small business employers and employees and concealment of 
material facts which induced them to purchase what they believed 
                     
0
  Except for the testimony of Kenneth Harris, Judge Scirica does 
not believe the other victims' testimony was prejudicial.  In any 
event, the errors, if any, were harmless. 
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to be fully insured health care coverage.  Substantial evidence 
of the actual scheme to defraud was also presented at trial. 
Eighteen of the twenty victim-witnesses who testified were 
improperly denied coverage even though they paid premiums for 
what they believed to be a fully insured health care plan. 
Sokolow was forced to deny claims to make up for a shortage in 
the claims reserve fund, since he diverted a large portion of the 
collected premiums to his personal bank accounts.  Thus, it is 
"highly probable" that Sokolow would have been convicted of mail 
fraud even without adverse consequences testimony.  Any error, 
therefore, was harmless. 
 B. Defendant's Challenges to Jury Instructions 
  1. Scienter Element for Violation of Money Laundering 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 
 Sokolow asserts that the district court improperly 
instructed the jury on the scienter element of 18 U.S.C. §1957.0  
                     
0
  The district court's instructions to the jury regarding the 
money laundering offense, read as follows: 
 
[T]here are five elements in money laundering: 
 
1. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the defendant knowingly engaged or attempted 
to engage in a monetary transaction. 
2. The defendant knew the transaction involved in 
this case, I am going to use the word money, 
monies that were criminally received. 
3. The criminally derived property must have a value 
in excess of $10,000. 
4. The criminally derived property must have been in 
fact derived from a specified unlawful activity. 
That's the money laundering counts. 
5. The money transaction must have taken place in the 
United States of America. 
 
App. at 944-45. 
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That section makes it unlawful for a person to " knowingly 
engage[] or attempt[] to engage in a monetary transaction in 
criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and 
is derived from specified unlawful activity." Id.  The elements 
necessary to prove a violation of § 1957 are that 
 
(1) the defendant engage or attempt to engage (2) in a 
monetary transaction (3) in criminally derived property 
that is of a value greater than $10,000 (4) knowing 
that the property is derived from unlawful activity, 
and (5) the property is, in fact, derived from 
'specified unlawful activity.' 
United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 567 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 Defendant contends that the knowledge requirement of § 1957 
requires "proof that Sokolow knew his conduct was prohibited by 
law."  As Sokolow never objected to the instructions at issue, 
the court's review is limited to plain error, that is, the error 
must be "plain" and "affect[] substantial rights."  See United 
States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
United States v. Olano, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993); see also 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought 
to the attention of the court.").   
 In support of his argument, Sokolow relies primarily upon 
the Supreme Court decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 
655 (1994).  In Ratzlaf, the defendant was charged with violating 
31 U.S.C. § 5324, which makes it unlawful for a person to 
"structure" numerous transactions with several banks to evade the 
banks' obligation to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000. 
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See id. at 658.  Section 5322(a), Title 31, United States Code, 
imposes criminal penalties for a "person willfully violating" the 
antistructuring provision.  At issue was the trial court's 
instruction that the government did not have to prove the 
defendant knew the "structuring" in which he engaged was 
unlawful, but only that the defendant knew of the reporting 
obligation and attempted to evade that obligation.  In reversing 
the court of appeals, which upheld the conviction, the Supreme 
Court held that in order to give effect to § 5322(a)'s 
"willfulness" requirement, the government must prove that the 
defendant knew the structuring in which he was engaged was 
unlawful.  114 S.Ct. at 663.  The Court was unpersuaded by 
arguments that the offense of structuring is "so obviously 'evil' 
or inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement [of § 5324 
is] satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the 
illegality of structuring."  Id. at 662. 
 Sokolow claims that the offense of money laundering is 
analogous to the offense at issue in Ratzlaf.  He argues that 
engaging in monetary transactions, such as bank depositing, with 
known criminal proceeds is not conduct that is "obviously evil or 
inherently bad."  Sokolow contends the jury must find that he 
knew his spending and regular bank transactions were prohibited 
by law. 
 Absent a "willfulness" requirement, however, we will not 
require proof of knowledge of illegality to sustain a conviction 
under the money laundering provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  In 
United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 (3d Cir.), cert. 
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denied, 115 S.Ct. 1699 (1995), in discussing the proof necessary 
for bankruptcy fraud, we stated that "[t]he statutory requirement 
that the underlying acts be performed 'knowingly' requires only 
that the act be voluntary and intentional and not that a person 
knows that he is breaking the law."  In Zehrbach, we 
distinguished Ratzlaf on the basis of the "willfulness" element 
required under the structuring offense.  Id.; see also United 
States v. Hilliard, 31 F.3d 1509, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994) (Ratzlaf 
proof of knowledge of illegality requirement not applicable to, 
inter alia, § 1957 money laundering provision); United States v. 
Santos, 20 F.3d 280, 284 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ratzlaf not 
applicable to § 1956 money laundering provision because of 
absence of willfulness requirement).  Similarly, as § 1957 does 
not contain a willfulness requirement, we decline to adopt 
Ratzlaf for the money laundering provision at issue in this case. 
 Moreover, Sokolow's citation to our decision in United 
States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994), is distinguishable. 
In Curran, we followed Ratzlaf in construing the "willfulness" 
component of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), which makes it unlawful to 
deliberately cause another person to perform an act that would 
violate federal criminal law.  20 F.3d at 566-68.  In that case, 
defendant was charged with causing election campaign treasurers 
to submit false reports to the Federal Election Commission in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 1001, the false statement 
statute.  Id. at 562.  Thus, unlike the money laundering statute 
involved here, "willfulness" was an element of the crime at issue 
in Curran.  See id. at 567-68.  In sum, we find the district 
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court properly instructed the jury on the scienter element of 
Sokolow's money laundering violation. 
  2. Criminally Derived Property Element of § 1957 
 Sokolow asserts that the district court committed plain 
error in the jury instruction as to the element of § 1957 that 
requires the criminally derived property in a monetary 
transaction to have a value in excess of $10,000.  Specifically, 
Sokolow asserts that in the court's explanation of "tracing" 
criminal proceeds, the district court erred in stating the 
following: 
[T]he Government need not prove that there [sic] $20,000 
came from this sale over here, because as I understand it, 
the Government's theory is these different sums -- they have 
to initially prove they came from NIBA.  It has to prove 
that it came from NIBA, initially, but not what NIBA 
account. 
 
  So the matter goes from $20,000 from NIBA to Sokolow & 
Associates and then Sokolow & Associates spends the money or 
spends a similar sum of money some places.  They don't have 
to prove it's the same $20,000 that went from Sokolow's 
[account] to Sokolow & Associates.  The Government need not 
prove that all the property involved in the transaction was 
the proceeds of the money laundering.  It is sufficient if 
the Government proves at least part of the property 
represents such proceeds. 
App. at 945 (emphasis on alleged error).  Sokolow alleges that 
the instruction "allowed the jury to convict simply on a showing 
that even $1 of the proceeds of fraud were deposited into a 
Sokolow account and later used to pay, in part, for the items 
charged [in the counts] of the indictment."  We find this 
contention is without merit.   
 It is clear from the full context of the district judge's 
explanation of the concept of proceeds that he is addressing the 
absence of a legal requirement that the government trace the 
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funds constituting criminal proceeds when they are commingled 
with funds obtained from legitimate sources.  See United States 
v. Johnson, 971 F.2d at 570 (noting that there is no requirement 
that government "show that funds withdrawn from the defendant's 
account could not possibly have come from any source other than 
the unlawful activity.").  We find no error in the district 
court's jury instructions in this regard. 
  3. Sokolow's Responsibility for Actions of His Agents 
 Sokolow alleges error in the district court's jury 
instructions as to Sokolow's responsibility for actions of his 
agents, particularly as it relates to "insurance agents' improper 
use of the Blue Cross logo on advertisements as part of the fraud 
scheme."  The instruction read as follows: 
  In order to sustain the burden of proof in this 
matter, it is not necessary in either of these counts 
to prove -- these types of crimes -- to prove that the 
defendant did everything, every act.  A person can act 
through his agent, and therefore, if the acts or 
conduct of another were ordered by the defendant or 
directed by the defendant or authorized by the 
defendant, the law holds the defendant responsible for 
the acts, just as if he had personally done them.  That 
includes both human beings and corporate agents. 
App. at 945.  According to Sokolow, the jury instruction is 
erroneous in that  
the jury could have found Sokolow guilty of mail fraud 
if he authorized employees to prepare marketing 
materials for his plan, and those employees on their 
own misrepresented the extent of Blue Cross 
underwriting in such materials.  No proof that Sokolow 
directed the misrepresentations with an intent to 
defraud was demanded. 
Appellant's Br. at 26.  Sokolow quotes the court in Curran, 20 
F.3d at 567, which stated that, "Section 2(b) [of Title 18, 
United States Code] imposes criminal liability on those persons 
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who possess the mens rea to commit an offense and cause others to 
violate a criminal statute." 
 As defendant did not object to the jury instruction, we 
review the district court's failure to provide a specific 
instruction for plain error only.  See United States v. Xavier, 2 
F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d Cir. 1993).  Reading the jury instructions in 
context, the district judge clearly explains the scienter 
requirements to convict Sokolow of both the mail fraud and money 
laundering offenses.  See App. at 941 ("[T]he defendant, Mr. 
Sokolow, is charged with knowingly and unlawfully devising and 
intend[ing] to defraud the members of [NIBA] . . . and that he 
knowingly caused the United States [mails] to be used to execute 
these schemes or this scheme."); App. at 944 ("[T]he Government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was -- that not 
only was there a fraudulent activity, but the defendant had a 
conscious intent to defraud. . . . [T]he defendant himself did 
not have to mail anything.  He may or he can order someone to do 
it.");  App. at 945 ("The Government must prove that the 
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defendant knew that property involved in the money transaction 
constituted or was derived, either directly or indirectly from a 
criminal offense . . . .  [H]e has to know he received this money 
through fraudulent means.  He has to be conscious of that."). The 
jury was instructed properly that intent to defraud was required.  
Thus, we find no plain error in the district court's instruction 
and we affirm Sokolow's conviction.   
III.  CHALLENGES TO SENTENCING 
 
 A. Calculation Under the Sentencing Guidelines 
 In determining the sentencing guideline range, the district 
court grouped together Sokolow's mail fraud and money laundering 
counts pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c)0.  The higher offense 
level for the two groups, the money laundering offense, was used 
for computing the sentence.  Sokolow does not contest the 
grouping of the counts.   
 
  1. The "value of funds" 
 Sokolow asserts that the district court incorrectly applied 
the Sentencing Guidelines to determine the "value of funds" 
involved in the money laundering offense.  The "value of funds" 
involved in a money laundering offense is a specific offense 
characteristic.  U.S.S.G. § 2S1.2(b).  Under § 1B1.3, specific 
offense characteristics are determined by "relevant conduct," 
defined, inter alia, as  
                     
0
  All references to the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual are to the 1988 version, as used in the presentence 
investigation report ("PSR") and apparently adopted by the 
district court, unless otherwise noted.  See Appellant's Br., 
Addendum D at 2 n.2. 
28 
(1)  all acts and omissions committed or aided and 
abetted by the defendant, or for which the 
defendant would be otherwise accountable, that 
occurred during the commission of the offense of 
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in 
the course of attempting to avoid detection or 
responsibility for that offense, or that otherwise 
were in furtherance of that offense; 
 
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for 
which §3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple 
counts, all such acts and omissions that were part 
of the same course of conduct or common scheme or 
plan as the offense of conviction. 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(2).  When reviewing a district court's 
sentencing decisions, the court has plenary review over questions 
as to the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines.  United States v. 
Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1995).  Factual 
determinations underlying the application of the guidelines are 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.  Id.   
 As to the money laundering counts, the presentence 
investigation report ("PSR") determined that over $2.2 million in 
proceeds from the unlawful mail fraud scheme had been laundered 
by Sokolow.  PSR at 6.  This amount represented the commissions 
received by Sokolow through AIM, and the related insurance 
agencies, Sokolow & McMillan, and Sokolow, McMillan & O'Leary. In 
addition to this amount, the district court added the additional 
$1.8 million Sokolow received in salary, officer's loans, and 
other disbursements to calculate the "value of funds" involved in 
the money laundering offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines.  
The district court concluded that Sokolow had converted $4 
million from the mail fraud scheme for personal benefit, and, 
therefore, this amount represented the "accurate measure of harm 
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from Defendant's money laundering offenses."0 See Appellant's 
Br., Addendum D, at 13.  Sokolow argues the district court 
erroneously included the $1.8 million as relevant conduct of the 
money laundering offense, without determining whether that amount 
independently satisfied the elements of §1957, namely, that 
Sokolow engaged in monetary transactions in criminally derived 
property of a value greater than $10,000.  We disagree with 
Sokolow's contention.     
 We have previously noted that the commentary to U.S.S.G. 
§2S1.1 does not define "the value of funds."  United States v. 
Thompson, 40 F.3d 48, 51 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 
1390 (1995).  In Thompson, we stated that "[the Commentary] 
states that '[t]he amount of money involved is included as a 
factor because it is an indicator of the magnitude of the 
criminal enterprise, and the extent to which the defendant aided 
the enterprise.'"  Id.  In United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 
562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992), the court stated that "the measure of 
harm under § 2S1.1 is the total amount of the funds involved." In 
dicta, the Johnson court noted that  
[F]unds associated with uncharged instances of money 
laundering can be added in to determine the offense 
level under § 2S1.1 if those acts are within the scope 
                     
0
  Section 2S1.2(b)(2) (Engaging in Monetary Transactions in 
Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity) of the 
Sentencing Guidelines provides that: 
 
If the value of the funds exceeded $100,000, increase 
the offense level as specified in § 2S1.1(b)(2). 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.2.  Section 2S1.1(b)(2) lists the value of funds 
and the corresponding increase in offense level.  The Guidelines 
prescribe a seven level increase in the offense level when the 
value of funds exceeds $3,500,000. 
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of relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2).  Thus, in 
determining the 'value of funds' under § 2S1.1, the 
district court is not necessarily limited only to the 
funds identified with the counts of conviction. 
Id. at 576 n.10.   
 We find that the district court did not err in finding the 
additional $1.8 million as "relevant conduct" within the meaning 
of the sentencing guidelines.  As previously noted, this amount 
was derived from Sokolow's unlawful mail fraud scheme.  Further, 
Sokolow's accountant testified that the $4 million represented 
the total amount of funds disbursed from NIBA to Sokolow during 
the period relevant to the mail fraud scheme.  As such acts were 
"part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as 
the offense of conviction," U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), we find that 
the $1.8 million was properly considered "relevant conduct" under 
the Sentencing Guidelines even though this amount was not charged 
in the money laundering counts.  See United States v. Rose, 20 
F.3d 367, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that uncharged acts of 
money laundering may be considered in determining appropriate 
sentence under Sentencing Guidelines). 
  2. Abuse of position of trust enhancement. 
 Sokolow received a two-level enhancement for abuse of 
position of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  That section states, 
in relevant part: 
If the defendant abused a position of public or private 
trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that 
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment 
of the offense, increase by 2 levels. 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  At the time of the relevant offenses, 
Application Note 1 in the commentary to this section stated the 
following: 
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The position of trust must have contributed in some 
substantial way to facilitating the crime and not 
merely have provided an opportunity that could as 
easily have been afforded to other persons.  This 
adjustment, for example, would not apply to an 
embezzlement by an ordinary bank teller. 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.1).0  In applying this section, "a 
sentencing court must determine whether a defendant was placed in 
a position of trust, and if he was, whether he abused that 
position in a way that significantly facilitated his crime." 
United States v. Craddock, 993 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1993).  The 
inquiry into whether someone obtains a position of trust 
approaches a purely legal determination for which de novo review 
is appropriate.  Id.; see also United States v. Lieberman, 971 
F.2d 989, 993 (3d Cir. 1992).  Whether or not a defendant abuses 
a position of trust more closely resembles a question of fact and 
is reviewed for clear error.  Craddock, 993 F.2d at 340.  
 Sokolow argued before the district court, as he does here on 
appeal, that enhancement for abuse of position of trust is 
                     
0
  Application Note 1 of the Commentary has since been clarified 
as follows: 
 
'Public or private trust' refers to a position of 
public or private trust characterized by professional 
or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial 
discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given 
considerable deference).  Persons holding such 
positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less 
supervision than employees whose responsibilities are 
primarily non-discretionary in nature.  For this 
enhancement to apply, the position of trust must have 
contributed in some significant way to facilitating the 
commission or concealment of the offense (e.g., by 
making the detection of the offense or the defendant's 
responsibility for the offense more difficult). 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.1) (1994). 
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inappropriate because Sokolow was not in a position of trust and 
because there were no "victims" to the money laundering counts.0  
Relying upon United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 473 (10th Cir. 
1993), the district court rejected Sokolow's argument. In Lowder, 
the Tenth Circuit upheld an enhancement for abuse of position of 
trust for a money laundering conviction where (1) as a CPA, 
defendant provided tax and financial advice to elderly and 
unsophisticated clients; (2) he advised his clients to place 
their money with him and promised them security; and (3) as 
president of the fraudulent investment corporations, he was free 
to spend that money, without oversight.  Id.  In this case, the 
district court determined that Sokolow, as CEO and President of 
NIBA, abused a position of trust in facilitating the commission 
                     
0
  At sentencing, Sokolow received a two-level upward adjustment 
for his organizer/leader role in the mail fraud offenses under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.  See Appellant's Br., Addendum D, at 5; PSR, ¶ 
27, at 6.  Under the sentencing guidelines in effect on the date 
of defendant's sentencing, the abuse of a position of trust 
adjustment would also apply to the mail fraud offenses, in 
addition to the organizer/leader role enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 
3b1.3 (1994).  It appears, however, that because the new 
guidelines would result in an increased sentence, the district 
court adopted the PSR's use of the sentencing guidelines in 
effect at the time defendant committed the offenses.  See 
Appellant's Br., Addendum D, at 2 n.2.  Thus, an upward 
adjustment for the abuse of position of trust could "not be 
employed in addition to that provided for in §3B1.1."  U.S.S.G. 
§3B1.1.  Accordingly, the abuse of position of trust enhancement 
could only apply to the money laundering counts.  See U.S.S.G. 
§1.B1.11 (b)(1) ("If the court determines that use of the 
Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is 
sentenced would violate the ex post facto clause of the United 
States Constitution, the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in 
effect on date that the offense of conviction was committed."); 
see also United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 623 (3d Cir. 
1995) ("to apply a change in the guidelines that enhances the 
penalty would offend the ex post facto clause of the United 
States Constitution"). 
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of the money laundering offenses.  The court relied upon the fact 
that Sokolow marketed his insurance plans to small-business 
owners and self-employed persons, and was freely able to spend 
the derived monies as he wished. 
 We agree with the district court's conclusion.  In United 
States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d Cir. 1994), we explained 
that in determining whether a position constitutes a position of 
trust for purposes of § 3B1.3, a court must consider: 
(1) whether the position allows the defendant to commit 
a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of 
authority which the position vests in defendant vis-a-
vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether 
there has been reliance on the integrity of the person 
occupying the position. 
Id.  The court further stated that, "[t]hese factors should be 
considered in light of the guiding rationale of the section--to 
punish 'insiders' who abuse their position rather than those who 
take advantage of an available opportunity."  Id. 
 Applying the Pardo factors to this case, we find that 
Sokolow held a position of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  First, 
as President of NIBA, Sokolow was able to commit difficult-to-
detect wrongs, as he had sole control over NIBA's accounts 
without oversight or supervision.  Second, Sokolow exercised the 
requisite degree of authority over the object of his wrong.  It 
was within Sokolow's authority to withdraw funds from NIBA and 
that authority was necessary for the commission of the money 
laundering offenses.0  Finally, as the district court noted, the 
                     
0
  Our reference to the money laundering offenses is only to the 
three money laundering counts that involved the laundering of 
monies from NIBA accounts to other assets that Sokolow owned or 
controlled.  The remaining counts appear to us to have involved 
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funds to be laundered were derived from Sokolow's marketing of 
NIBA insurance plans to small business owners and self-employed 
persons.  In selecting the NIBA health benefits plan for their 
employees and families, these members clearly placed a measure of 
reliance on the integrity of Sokolow in his position as President 
of NIBA.  NIBA members testified to receiving materials regarding 
the health benefits plan, signed by Sokolow in his capacity as 
President. 
 Sokolow argues that no fiduciary relationship existed with 
NIBA members in connection with the submission of premiums. 
Unlike in Lowder, where the defendant induced elderly and 
unsophisticated clients to entrust money to him to invest 
securely on their behalf, Sokolow contends that NIBA members had 
no similar expectation with premiums entrusted to NIBA.  We 
disagree.  NIBA members submitted premiums with the expectation 
that their health care claims would be covered by NIBA.  As 
president of NIBA, Sokolow was entrusted with the proper use of 
those funds.  Thus, Sokolow held a formal position of trust vis-
a-vis NIBA members. 
 As Sokolow occupied a position of trust, it must be 
determined whether he abused this position "in a manner that 
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the 
                                                                  
only transfers of criminally derived monies from personal 
accounts that Sokolow owned or controlled to other assets or 
accounts that Sokolow owned or controlled.  As to these money 
laundering counts, we find no position of trust warranting the 
enhancement.  See United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1112 
(3d Cir. 1993) ("To abuse a position of trust, a defendant must, 
by definition, have taken criminal advantage of a trust 
relationship between himself and his victim."). 
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offense."  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  As indicated, the district court 
found that Sokolow's role as president facilitated the commission 
of the money laundering offenses.  Sokolow had significant 
authority over the distribution of NIBA funds.  As the district 
court noted, Sokolow was "free to spend the money as he wished." 
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not clearly err 
in finding an abuse of position of trust.  In sum, we will affirm 
the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
 B. The Restitution Order 
 The district court ordered Sokolow to pay $690,246 in 
restitution to 17 NIBA members in the amount of unpaid claims for 
medical care and treatment.  According to the government, the 
basis for calculating the losses was Gov't Ex. B-110, the 
Inservco compilation of adjusted, unpaid claims.  The restitution 
amount excluded $238,111.46 claimed by Kenneth Harris for 
uncovered medical care claims.  The district court stated that 
"[t]he evidence at trial and the sentencing hearing does not 
support any other reductions in the amount of restitution." 
 Generally, the "district judge must point to evidence in the 
record supporting the calculation of loss to the victims." 
Copple, 24 F.3d at 549-50.  Sokolow argues that other factual 
evidence in the record warrants further adjustment to many of the 
alleged unpaid claims.  Sokolow cites five examples of NIBA 
members whose alleged unpaid claims should have been reduced. 
 
 (1) Martha Mosher submitted a $12,000 claim, 
which was valued by the liquidator at $512.  The court 
awarded her $51,834.99.  In Gov't Ex. B-110, this 
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amount is listed as an adjusted unpaid claim for Shawn 
Mosher. 
 
 (2)  Patricia and Gerald Ferrier's claims were valued 
by the statutory liquidator at zero.  This amount is 
reflected in Gov't Ex. B-110.  Yet, the district court 
granted them $3492 in restitution. 
 
 (3)  Olivia Anderson submitted no documents in support 
of her claim, and a letter from the statutory liquidator 
stated that all her bills had been paid but one.  The court 
granted her $47,654.  Further, she is not listed in the 
excerpts of Gov't Ex. B-110, and the parties have not 
indicated from where this amount derives. 
 
 (4) David Ahakinian and William Vincent Bradford were 
allegedly not paid claims because they misrepresented 
preexisting conditions.  They disputed these allegations on 
the witness stand.  The district court awarded them $45,450 
and $277,377 respectively. 
See Appellant's Br. at 39-40. 
 Sokolow correctly contends that the basis upon which the 
restitution awards was granted is unclear from Gov't Ex. B-110, 
and often contradicted by trial testimony.  We will remand the 
restitution order for the district court to make specific factual 
findings regarding the actual amount of recoverable loss 
sustained by these claimants. 
 C. The Forfeiture Order 
 The district court ordered Sokolow to forfeit $2,141,108.67, 
plus the contents of a Commonwealth Federal Savings and Loan 
Account, all to be satisfied from substitute assets. 
 1.  Identifiable Forfeitable "Property" 
 Sokolow challenges the validity of the special verdict forms 
used by the jury with regard to 17 money laundering counts.  As 
an example, the verdict forms for the counts read as follows: 
ITEM 1.  $125,000.00 
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We the jury find that the property identified as Item 1 is: 
 
a)  Property involved in the violation of money laundering 
(18 U.S.C. § 1957) charged in Count 126 of the 
Indictment and[/]or property traceable to such 
property. 
 
YES  ________ 
 
NO   ________ 
 
App. at 974.  The jury marked "YES" for each of the monetary 
amounts listed for the money laundering counts.  The criminal 
forfeiture provision provides as follows: 
The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted 
of an offense in violation of [inter alia, 18 U.S.C. 
§1957], shall order that the person forfeit to the 
United States any property, real or personal, involved 
in such offense, or any property traceable to such 
property.   
18 U.S.C § 982(a) (1994).  Sokolow argues that the special 
verdict forms are invalid because they failed to identify 
specifically the property involved.  We disagree.  Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(2) provides that  
[n]o judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a 
criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the 
information shall allege the extent of the interest or 
property subject to forfeiture. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2).  Further, Rule 31(e) provides that 
[i]f the indictment or the information alleges that an 
interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, 
a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of 
the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(e).  The indictment specifically alleges the 
amounts involved, and from where the amounts are derived.  We 
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find that the special verdict forms elicited the proper findings 
from the jury. 
 2.  Substitutable Assets 
 Sokolow argues that the forfeiture of substitute assets on 
the basis of the invalid special verdict forms was improper.  As 
noted above, however, the verdict forms were appropriate, and, 
thus, Sokolow's argument on this ground is without merit. 
 Sokolow also challenges the order of forfeiture of 
substitute assets on the basis that the government failed to 
demonstrate that this action was appropriate.  In general, we may 
not set aside the district court's factual findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 
F.3d 794, 804 (3d Cir. 1994).  Forfeiture of substitute assets 
may be ordered if the property traceable to money laundering, as 
a result of any act or omission of the defendant,  
 
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due 
diligence; (2) has been transferred or sold to, or 
deposited with, a third party; (3) has been placed 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (4) has been 
substantially diminished in value, or (5) has been 
commingled with other property which cannot be divided 
without difficulty. 
21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1994).  In this regard, the district court 
found that Sokolow diminished the value of certain real estate 
property owned by him, and transferred much of his assets to 
other parties and family members, over whom he still exercised 
control.  We find no clear error in the district court's order of 
forfeiture of substitute assets. 
 3.  Criminal Forfeiture Under Count 126 
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 Count 126 charged Sokolow with a money laundering 
transaction involving $125,000 made on October 4, 1988.  The most 
recent amendment to the forfeiture statute, however, became 
effective on November 18, 1988.  Sokolow asserts that, on ex post 
facto grounds, this forfeiture should be vacated. 
 Prior to November 18, 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 982 permitted the 
forfeiture of  
 
any property, real or personal, which represents the 
gross receipts the person obtained, directly or 
indirectly, as a result of such offense, or which is 
traceable to such gross receipts. 
18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).  The 
legislative history of the statute suggested a narrow reading of 
the statute stating that "gross receipts" meant "only the 
commission earned by the money launderer . . ., and not the 
corpus laundered itself."  S. Rep No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
23 (1986).  According to Sokolow, only later was the statute 
amended to cover "any property, real or personal, involved in 
such offense, or any property traceable to such property." 
Appellant's Br. at 48-49 (quoting Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 6463, 102 Stat. 4374 (1988)).  
 Neither party has cited any case law interpreting "gross 
receipts" to mean the "corpus laundered."  The government argues, 
however, that where, as here, the defendant committed the 
specified unlawful activity as well as the money laundering 
violation, the corpus of the money is the "gross receipts" to the 
defendant and is thus forfeitable.  We agree. 
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 As Sokolow was the person committing the unlawful activity 
of mail fraud and also laundering money derived from that 
unlawful activity, it is clear that he obtained the total 
$125,000 as the "gross receipts" of the money laundering offense. 
There is no need for a finding that "Sokolow paid himself a 
commission for laundering his own money."  See Appellant's Br. at 
49.  The money was derived from unlawful activity, and there is 
no evidence indicating that this does not represent the "gross 
receipts" of his money laundering scheme.  As review by this 
court is for plain error (Sokolow did not challenge this issue at 
trial), we find that the district court did not err in 
instructing the jury to determine whether the $125,000 was the 
amount "involved in the violation of money laundering." 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 In light of the foregoing, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence, and the forfeiture order.  We will 
remand for entry of a new restitution order in accordance with 
this opinion. 
 
